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TAMING THE BEAST: HOW THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME 
CREATES AND CONTAINS FLAGS OF 
CONVENIENCE 
ERIC POWELL* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Centuries-old maritime jurisprudence continues to guide the law of the 
sea today.  These baseline understandings are necessary to maintain 
order of the largest international commons, the sea.1  The seas’ central 
role in globalization, though, strains some of this established law.  In 
particular, the question of jurisdiction has become increasingly complex 
as ships regularly ply every ocean and visit ports in dozens of countries.  
Many of these ships are actually subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of 
States with which they have no connection and which have limited 
incentives to regulate.  This paper explores how this jurisdictional non 
sequitur arose, and when international law permits concurrent 
jurisdiction. Specifically, this paper emphasizes when U.S. courts can 
reach activities on the seas. 
The seas are both the lynchpin of global trade and the site of global 
disasters.  Nearly 105,000 ships2 transport more than 90% of world 
  
 * Eric Powell served eight years in the Navy’s active and reserve Information Dominance 
Corps.  He wrote this paper in partial fulfillment of his J.D.  It was awarded Harvard Law School’s 
Addison-Brown Prize for writing on maritime and private international law.   He is a graduate of 
Harvard Law School and Harvard College. 
 1. 71% of the Earth is covered by water.  Aquatic Commons, Distribution of the Earth’s 
Water, http://aquaticcommons.org/650/1/Poster13E.pdf (last visited March 16, 2013). 
 2. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Review of Maritime Transport, at 
36-37, UNCTAD/RMT/2011 (Nov. 22, 2011) [hereinafter RMT]. 
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trade,3 including oil, chemicals, consumer durables and non-durables, 
food, and people.4  Consider, though, recent reminders that the seas are 
more than globalization superhighways.  The quest for new sources of oil 
tragically resulted in the 2010 Deepwater Horizon spill, which released 
five million barrels of crude oil into the Gulf of Mexico.5  Less than 
eighteen months later, the grounding of the New Zealand-bound 
container ship Rena dumped oil into the sea and onto the shores, harming 
regional wildlife.6  In January 2012, a cruise liner dramatically sunk off 
the coast of Italy, killing at least twenty-one passengers.7 
Tragedies on the maritime commons present unique considerations.8  On 
ships, there is a preliminary question of what authority can set and 
enforce standards on these floating islands.  Then, the question of what 
authority should have jurisdiction arises.  The list of potential candidates 
is long: should it follow the ship owner’s nationality, the crew’s 
nationality,9 the incident site, or any of a host of other factors?  Further 
complicating the analysis is the possibility that multiple authorities 
should exercise jurisdiction. 
For at least four reasons, States, for their part, are invested in regulating 
seas, even those far from their coastline.  First, tragedies can strike in any 
country’s backyard.  Second, even local mishaps such as pollution can 
have consequences far from the site.  Third, every State has an interest in 
maintaining the utility of the sea.  Fourth, States are interested in 
regulating and protecting their nationals around the world.  However, a 
  
 3. United Nations International Maritime Organization [IMO], International Shipping Facts 
and Figures, 7 (2011), http://www.imo.org/KnowledgeCentre/ShipsAndShippingFactsAndFigures/ 
Statisticalresources/Documents/December%202011%20update%20to%20July%202011%20version
%20of%20International%20Shipping%20Facts%20and%20Figures.pdf. 
 4. RMT, supra note 2, at 36-37. 
 5. See articles listed at Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/o/oil_spills/gulf_of_mexico_2010/index
.html (last visited March 16, 2013). 
 6. Oil Spill Disaster New Zealand’s ‘Worst in Decades’, BBC (Oct. 11, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-15251319. 
 7. Italy Extends Probe on Cruise Ship Accident, REUTERS (Feb. 22, 2012), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/22/italy-ship-investigation-idUSR1E8CQ02620120222. 
 8. Consider, for example, the different risk preferences in the United States and China.  
American factory safety standards are more stringent than China’s.  As one observer noted after a 
recent fatal Chinese factory fire, “[W]hat’s morally repugnant in one country is accepted business 
practices in another . . . .”  Charles Duhigg and David Barboza, In China, Human Costs are Built 
Into an iPad, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/business/ieconomy-
apples-ipad-and-the-human-costs-for-workers-in-china.html?pagewanted=all.  
 9. Ships’ crews are representative of the global nature of the business: more than 1.5 million 
seafarers of nearly every nationality operate ships.  IMO, International Shipping Facts and Figures – 
Information Resources on Trade, Safety, Security, Environment, at 9 (March 6, 2012), 
http://www.imo.org/KnowledgeCentre/ShipsAndShippingFactsAndFigures/TheRoleandImportanceo
fInternationalShipping/Documents/International%20Shipping%20-
%20Facts%20and%20Figures.pdf. 
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system in which States project unrestrained regulatory power far from 
their coastlines would be untenable for at least two reasons.10  First, this 
unrestrained regulatory power may result in commerce-crippling 
conflicting jurisdiction.  United States Supreme Court Justice Jackson 
presciently emphasized this insight when he wrote: 
[T]he virtue and utility of sea-borne commerce lies in its 
frequent and important contacts with more than one country. If, 
to serve some immediate interest, the courts of each were to 
exploit every such contact to the limit of its power, it is not 
difficult to see that a multiplicity of conflicting and overlapping 
burdens would blight international carriage by sea.11 
Second, extraterritorial regulation raises a national sovereignty concern.  
As Chief Justice Marshall famously penned in the seminal United States 
Supreme Court case on the matter, “[t]he jurisdiction of the nation within 
its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute.”12  Therefore, a 
sovereign rightfully claims that foreign powers lack jurisdiction within 
its land borders.  A sovereign would similarly object to foreigners 
reaching for jurisdiction over its local seas or vessels over which it 
accepted sovereignty. 
The limits on regulating the maritime commons inherent in a 
Westphalian system of nation-States has long been resolved by assigning 
regulatory, criminal, and civil jurisdiction to a vessel’s State of 
Registration.13  In other words, the laws of the nation that charter the 
vessel – which corresponds to the flag the ship flies – govern most 
aspects of the ship’s operations as well as personal conduct onboard.  
This compromise is referred to as the “law of the flag.” 
In order for the law of the flag to satisfy States’ collective maritime 
interests, registering States must promulgate and enforce legal regimes 
  
 10. This is a long-standing conundrum of conflict of law.  The United States considered its 
implications for State-exercised personal jurisdiction in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877) 
And so it is laid down by jurists, as an elementary principle, that the laws of one State 
have no operation outside of its territory, except so far as is allowed by comity; and that 
no tribunal established by it can extend its process beyond that territory so as to subject 
either persons or property to its decisions. 
 11. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 581 (1953). 
 12. The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 136 (1812).  This was the Supreme 
Court’s first case concerning the United States Federal Courts' jurisdiction over a claim against a 
friendly foreign military vessel visiting an American port.  Interpreting customary international law, 
the Court concluded that there was no jurisdiction. 
 13. BOLESLAW ADAM BOCZEK, FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE: AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDY 
158 n.5 (Harvard University Press, 1962) (identifying a number of authoritative sources for this 
proposition and asserting that “[t]his has been confirmed by practically all writers.”). 
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that protect sister States’ reasonable interests.  That requirement leads to 
two simple questions.  First, what sorts of States are less likely to create 
or enforce such a regime?  Second, how can sister States legally protect 
their interests when the registering State fails to do so?  
One set of States that might neglect to create or enforce a maritime legal 
regime are those willing to register, or to “flag” ships with which they 
have minimal or no connection.  Perhaps the ship’s owner, operator, 
captain, and crew are from a different State.  Or maybe the ship’s 
operations are unconnected with the flag State: for example, the ship may 
never dock there or carry cargo relevant to the flag State.  In an extreme 
case, the flagging State may be landlocked.  In short, the flag is a “flag of 
convenience” (FOC), and the flagging State’s incentives to maintain a 
minimally acceptable legal regime is open to question.   
Today, FOC vessels account for a disproportionate amount of shipping 
vessels.14  With State-vessel ties as flimsy as a few sheets of paper, it is 
conceivable that these States lack the interest and capacity to regulate all 
vessels carrying their flag.  That developing countries, with troubles 
more pressing than maritime regulation, predominate the FOC registries15 
exacerbates this concern.  Consequently, the international community 
faces the possibility that its growth relies on an industry that operates in a 
regulatory vacuum despite its potential to harm any nation.   
This paper aims to better understand the circumstances in which a flag 
State’s exclusive jurisdiction can be challenged.  The next three parts 
explain the legal regime from which flags of convenience emerged: Part 
II describes the freedom of navigation, Part III explains the historical law 
of the flag, and Part IV reviews the vessel registration process and the 
sovereign’s right to establish domestic flagging standards.  Part V draws 
on these fundamental principles to explain the emergence of FOCs.  Part 
VI explores the theoretical and experiential concerns FOCs raise.  Part 
VII examines the various jurisdictional bases of international law.  In 
Part VIII, these international law jurisdictional hooks are relied upon to 
evaluate what the international community can and has done in response 
to FOCs.  Part IX concludes. 
II. BASIC LAW OF THE SEA: FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION 
This section introduces the historical basis and present-day codification 
of the freedom of navigation.  The freedom of navigation is one of the 
  
 14. See FOC Countries, infra note 96, andaccompanying text. 
 15. See RMT, supra note 2, at 44. 
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most fundamental and widely recognized maritime principles.16  Today, 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)17 
provides freedom of the high seas, which includes the freedom to 
navigate the high seas without interference, to both coastal and land-
locked States.18  UNCLOS echoes the United Nation’s 1958 Convention 
on the High Seas (1958 Convention).19 
UNCLOS20 divides the sea into the zones illustrated in the image below: 
principally the territorial sea extends twelve nautical miles21 from the 
coast,22 the contiguous zone occupies the subsequent twelve nautical 
miles,23and the exclusive economic zone reaches to 200 nautical miles24 
after which lies the high seas.25  As explored in more detail below, the 
coastal State enjoys increasing power to regulate ship passage and 
activities closer to its shores.26  A coastal State’s ability to exercise 
jurisdiction is at its nadir on the high seas, which is “open to all States” 
200 miles from the coast.27 
  
 16. BOCZEK, supra note 13, at 2. 
 17. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 
[hereinafter UNCLOS].   UNCLOS is recognized as the “international constitution of the oceans” 
although the U.S. has not signed it.  Keith S. Gibel, Defined by the Law of the Sea: “High Seas” in 
the Marine Mammal Protection Act and the Endangered Species Act, 54 NAVAL L. REV. 54 (2007) 
(quoting Canada’s Ocean Strategy, Our Oceans, Our Future, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 5 (2002), 
http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/oceans/publications/cos-soc/pdf/cos-soc-eng.pdf). 
 18. Id. at Art. 87.  UNCLOS also recognizes freedom of the high seas to include overflight, 
submarine cable installation, artificial island construction, fishing and other rights. 
 19. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312 [hereinafter 1958 
Convention]. 
 20. The U.S. has incorporated many of the UNCLOS provisions into domestic law.  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ON FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES Introductory Note to 
Part V (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. 
 21. A nautical mile is approximately 1.15 miles. 
 22. UNCLOS, supra note 17, at Art. 3. 
 23. Id. at Art. 33. 
 24. Id. at Art. 57. 
 25. Id. at Art. 86. 
 26. See infra notes 273-280 and accompanying text. 
 27. UNCLOS, supra note 17, at Art. 87. 
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Jurists have recognized universal ownership and freedom of the high seas 
for centuries.  Valin, the author of an influential eighteenth century 
commentary on maritime law, explained, “[f]or in short the ocean 
belongs to no one, and the conclusion undoubtedly to be drawn from this 
is that all nations are permitted to navigate it.”29 Azuni, an eighteenth 
century Italian publicist, grounded this freedom on the seas’ economic 
importance as “great highways traced by nature between the different 
parts of the world,” when he wrote, “all have the same equal rights to 
[the seas’] use as the air they breathe, and to the sun that warms them.”30  
Their Swiss contemporary, Vattel, also concluded that no single State 
can regulate the seas.31  He relied on the observation that one may “sail 
and fish without the least prejudice to any person whatsoever.”32 Thus, 
there is a solid backing for the proposition that the high seas are a 
universal possession. 
III. LAW OF THE FLAG  
The observation that there is no single sovereign of the high seas (Part II) 
led to the emergence of “[p]erhaps the most venerable and universal rule 
of maritime law”33: the law of the flag.  This part presents the judicial and 
theoretical underpinnings of this regime.  States regulate and exercise 
  
 28. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association Office of the General Counsel, Maritime 
Zones and Boundaries, http://www.gc.noaa.gov/gcil_maritime.html (last visited March 18, 2013). 
 29. United States v. Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249, 281 (1893) (Brown, J., dissenting). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 272-73 (Gray, J., dissenting). 
 32. Id. at 281 (Brown, J., dissenting). 
 33. Lauritzen, supra note 11, 585.   
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jurisdiction over their registered vessels under the theory of the law of 
the flag. 
In 1927, the Permanent Court of International Justice (P.C.I.J.) affirmed 
the law of the flag in the Lotus case.34  In Lotus, the P.C.I.J. considered 
whether Turkey could exercise jurisdiction over the French officers of a 
French ship that fatally collided with a Turkish ship on the high seas.  
The Court declared, “apart from certain special cases which are defined 
by international law—vessels on the high seas are subject to no authority 
except that of the State whose flag they fly.”35  Although the P.C.I.J. 
subsequently found that this was a special case that warranted concurrent 
jurisdiction because the French officers affected a Turkish ship,36 the 
P.C.I.J.’s reasoning demonstrates the importance of the law of the flag. 
The theoretical premise for exclusive flag State jurisdiction arises from 
the historic concept of vessels as literally part of the flag-country’s 
territory.37  Based on this understanding, foreign jurisdiction would be a 
clear infringement on State sovereignty.  Although this territorial 
conception has largely been dismissed,38 the result that another State may 
not interfere persists, perhaps because of its simplicity.39  Today, 
UNCLOS mandates that “[s]hips shall sail under the flag of one State 
only and, save in exceptional cases expressly provided for in 
international treaties or in this Convention, shall be subject to its 
exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas.”40 
In summary, the law of the flag is the internationally accepted starting 
point of high seas jurisdiction.  As the P.C.I.J. Lotus opinion and the 
UNCLOS provisions acknowledge, there are exceptions to exclusive flag 
State jurisdiction.41  Concurrent jurisdiction of FOC ships hinges on 
those exceptions, which are based on geography, nationality, domestic 
  
 34. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.)1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7). 
 35. Id. at 25. 
 36. Id. at 23.  This holding was later reversed by the 1958 Convention and UNCLOS, which 
hold in favor of flag State jurisdiction even in international collisions.  See 1958 Convention, supra 
note 19, at Art. 11; UNCLOS, supra note 17, at Art. 97. 
 37. See, e.g., Rodgers, supra note 29, at 264 (“As we have before stated, a vessel is deemed 
part of the territory of the country to which she belongs.”); see also S.S. Lotus, supra note 34, at 25 
(“[W]hat occurs on board a vessel on the high seas must be regarded as if it occurred on the territory 
of the State whose flag the ship flies.”). 
 38. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 402 (rejecting the territory basis of high seas 
jurisdiction in favor of an independent basis). 
 39. See, e.g., Lauritzen, supra note 11, at 585 (“there must be some law on shipboard, that it 
cannot change at every change of waters, and no experience shows a better rule than that of the State 
that owns her.”). 
 40. UNCLOS, supra note 17, at Art. 92 (emphasis added). 
 41. See William Tetley, The Law of the Flag, ‘Flag Shopping,’ and Choice of Law, 17 TUL. 
MAR. L. J. 139, 158 (1993). 
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protection, and universal prohibitions.  Before exploring those alternate 
bases of jurisdiction, the following sections elaborate on how the 
flagging process gave rise to FOC States and their attendant concerns. 
IV. VESSEL REGISTRATION PROCESS 
This section examines vessel registration: the administrative process that 
connects a ship with a State.42  It discusses vessel owners’ legal 
obligation to register, States’ control of domestic registration 
requirements, diversity in registration requirements, and international 
recognition of foreign registrations. 
The requirement that all ships on the high seas have a registration is 
demonstrated by court cases denying legal rights to unregistered vessels.  
In 1982, the Eleventh Circuit considered two such cases in companion.43  
In the lead case, American authorities seized an unregistered vessel on 
the high seas44 and arrested its foreign crew on drug possession charges.45  
Unlike previous high-seas seizures, there was no evidence that the vessel 
was destined for, or had any connection with, the United States.46  
Nonetheless, the court held that international law permits jurisdiction 
over Stateless vessels47: they have no right to freedom of navigation 
because they are “international pariahs” that pose a threat to the order of 
the seas.48 
The Eleventh Circuit cited an influential 1948 English Privy Council 
opinion, The“Asya.”49  In that case, a British destroyer seized the “Asya” 
freighter on the high seas after designating it Stateless and discovering 
that it held 733 passengers with plans to sneak illegally into Palestine.50  
In upholding the seizure, the Council quoted Oppenheim’s turn of the 
century international law treatise, “[i]n the interest of order on the open 
sea, a vessel not sailing under the maritime flag of a State enjoys no 
protection whatever, for the freedom of navigation on the open sea is 
  
 42. BOCZEK, supra note 13, at 92; ROBERT RIENOW, THE TEST OF THE NATIONALITY OF A 
MERCHANT VESSEL 214 (Columbia University Press, 1937) (“About this proposition that vessels are 
stamped with the nationalities of particular States the whole of the maritime code for the regulation 
of the use of the high seas has been built.”). 
 43. United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. Fla. 1982).  Keep in mind that 
United States local and district court cases are not binding international law. 
 44. What makes a vessel Stateless is outside the scope of this paper.  In Marino-Garcia, the 
crewmembers asserted a false nationality.  Id. at 1378 n.3. 
 45. Id. at 1378. 
 46. Id. at 1377 n.1. 
 47. Id. at 1383.  Note, however, that there is a circuit split on the matter.  See id. at 1385. 
 48. Id. at 1382. 
 49. Id. at 1382-83 (citing NaimMolvanv. Attorney-General for Palestine (The “Asya”) [1948] 
1 A.C. 351 (P.C.)). 
 50. The "Asya", supra note 49.  See also 25 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 421-23 (1948). 
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freedom for such vessels only as sail under the flag of a State.”51  Today, 
UNCLOS codifies a vessel’s obligation to flag in its mandate that, 
“[s]hips shall sail under the flag of one State only.”52 
States exclusively control their domestic procedures for complying with 
this international requirement.  International law grants registering States 
nearly unfettered authority to dictate registration requirements,53 except 
that the registration (i) cannot infringe another State’s rights, (ii) cannot 
be granted if there is a reasonable suspicion that the vessel will be used 
to violate international law, (iii) must be for a single nationality, and (iv) 
must be in accordance with State treaties.54 
In perhaps the seminal case on this issue, the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration in the Hague considered Great Britain’s objection that 
France’s practice of flagging vessels from the British Muscat 
protectorate interfered with Muscat’s independence.55  The Court 
disagreed: it found that only France could restrict French registration 
rules.56  The United States has repeatedly guarded this sovereignty.  In 
fact, at the nation’s birth, one of Congress’s first acts was to outline the 
United States’ vessel registration system.57  A century later, the 
Commissioner of Navigation affirmed, “[the United States] judges of the 
requirements and of the formalities to be observed to give its national 
character to private trading-vessels.”58  Nearly a century later, the United 
States Supreme Court perfunctorily re-avowed, “[e]ach State under 
international law may determine for itself the conditions on which it will 
grant its nationality to a merchant ship.”59 Today, States’ registration 
  
 51. Id. (quoting OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 546 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 6th ed. vol. 1 
1944)). 
 52. UNCLOS, supra note 17, at Art. 92. 
 53. BOCZEK, supra note 13, at 105-06; EmekaDuruigbo, Multinational Corporations and 
Compliance with International Regulations Relating to the Petroleum Industry, 7 ANN. SURV. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 101, 109-10(2001) (citing Julie Mertus, The Nationality of Ships and International 
Responsibility: The Reflagging of the Kuwaiti Oil Tankers, 17 DENV. J. INT’L. L. & POL’Y 207 
(1988)). 
 54. BOCZEK, supra note 13 at 105-06; Duruigbo, supra note 53, at 109-10 (citing Mertus, 
supra note 53, at 207). 
 55. BOCZEK, supra note 13 at 100-01 (citing Muscat Dhows (Fr. v. Gr. Brit.), Hague Ct. Rep. 
(Scott) 93 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1905)). 
 56. Id. at 101.  The Court subsequently found that France had bound itself in a Franco-British 
treaty that prohibited this particular flagging. 
 57. H. Edwin Anderson, III, The Nationality of Ships and Flags of Convenience: Economics, 
Politics, and Alternatives, 21 TUL. MAR. L. J. 139, 145 (1996) (citing Act of Sept. 1, 1789, ch. 11, 1 
Stat. 55 (1789) (referred to as The Registration Act of 1789)). 
 58. RIENOW, supra note 42, at 17 (citing Mr. Fish to Admiral Polo de Bernabe, April 18, 1874, 
Virginius, 2 For. Rel. (1875-76) 1207-08). 
 59. Lauritzen, supra, note 11, at 584. 
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autonomy is codified in UNCLOS: “Every State shall fix the conditions 
for the grant of its nationality to ships.”60 
This sovereignty has resulted in significant variety among the more than 
150 States that register ships.61  Importantly, some States permit foreign 
ship owners to register their vessels.  Such an “open registry” contrasts 
with other States’ “closed registries,” which require domestic 
ownership.62  Registration requirements differ along other axes as well.  
For example, some States also require a portion of a vessel’s officer and 
crew to be nationals, and some even regulate a ship’s place of 
construction.63 
States are obliged to respect other States’ registration methods.64  For 
example, in The Virginius Incident in 1873, Spain argued that it 
permissibly seized a U.S. vessel on the high seas because, in 
contravention of American registry law, Cubans owned the vessel.65 
President Grant, his Secretary of State, and his Attorney General all 
responded that Spain must recognize the valid registry papers.66  They 
asserted that the United States had exclusive jurisdiction to inquire 
whether the papers were fraudulently obtained.67  Spain eventually 
returned the ship, because it recognized the validity of the ship’s 
registration papers.68  The Supreme Court later adopted President Grant’s 
position that “a registration can be questioned only by the registering 
State.”69 
V. FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE  
As described in the previous section, the international system grants 
States great flexibility to set registration terms that other States must 
recognize; this dynamic created the context for widespread use of Flags 
of Convenience (FOCs).  This section defines FOCs, explores the 
motives of FOC nations and FOC vessel owners, presents an example of 
an FOC regime, and estimates the size of the FOC market.   
  
 60. UNCLOS, supra note 17, at Art. 91.  Again, UNCLOS is only binding on signatory States. 
 61. RMT, supra note 2, at 48. 
 62. Anderson, supra note 57, at 151. 
 63. See id. at 155-56 for descriptions of US, British, Liberian, Panamanian, and Luxembourg 
registry requirements. 
 64. BOCZEK, supra note 13, at 112. 
 65. See BOCZEK, supra note 13, at 112. 
 66. BOCZEK, supra note 13, at 112-13. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 112.  It was too late, though, to save most of the crew and passengers from Spanish 
execution. 
 69. Lauritzen, supra note 11, at 584. 
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FOC is a slippery and generally pejorative term that describes a registry 
with certain characteristics and membership motivations.70  In a widely 
referenced 1970 British investigation of flags of convenience, the 
Rochdale Report by the British Committee of Inquiry identified six 
characteristics FOC registries often exhibit.71  First, FOCs are open 
registries: foreigners can own the vessel.72  Second, the registry is easily 
accessible, often from a consulate abroad.73  Third, the registry imposes 
minimal or no income taxes; revenues are predominately from registry 
and annual fees.74  Fourth, apart from the revenues, the level of 
registration exceeds the flag State’s requirements for domestic shipping, 
such as defense.75  The associated revenues may substantially impact the 
country’s finances.76  Fifth, there are no domestic crewing requirements.77  
And sixth, the flag State lacks the power and administration to 
effectively impose regulations.78 
In contrast to traditional maritime nations, whose registries are 
predominately motivated by the merchant marine’s role in national 
defense,79 FOC countries have predominately pecuniary motivations.80  
Financial motivations are not confined to direct revenues from registries: 
some countries use FOCs as a loss-leader to attract companies to 
offshore industries.81 Some scholars argue that FOC countries 
additionally seek international influence,82 though this is at most an 
ancillary motivation, especially at first.83 
  
 70. Anderson, supra note 57, at 157. 
 71. Quoted in Anderson, supra note 57, at 157. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 158. 
 79. RIENOW, supra note 42, at 5.  The merchant marine is critical to military sealift.  See infra 
notes 137-39 and accompanying text.  In addition, States can convert registered ships into warships 
or appropriate it for other purposes.  RIENOW, supra note 42, at 5, 7; see alsoinfra notes 133-135 and 
accompanying text. 
 80. Duruigbo, supra note 53, at 113 (citing Richard Payne, Flags of Convenience and Oil 
Pollution: A Threat to National Security, 3 HOUSTON J. INT’L L. 67, 69 (1980)). 
 81. ELIZABETH R. DESOMBRE, FLAGGING STANDARDS: GLOBALIZATION AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL, SAFETY, AND LABOR REGULATIONS AT SEA 213 (The MIT Press, 2006). 
 82. DESOMBRE, supra note 81, at 210; Anderson, supra note 57, at 160 n.137. 
 83. For this proposition, Anderson references Panama and Liberia’s leadership roles in the 
International Maritime Organization.  Supra note 57, at 160 n.137.  It should be recognized that the 
influence cited, then, is largely confined to the maritime sector itself.  Further, it did not arise 
organically but was begrudgingly accepted by the traditional maritime nations following a court 
order.  See also RODNEY CARLISLE, SOVEREIGNTY FOR SALE: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE 
PANAMANIAN AND LIBERIAN FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE 156-57 (Naval Institute Press, 1st ed. 1981).  
The court premised its mandate on the size of the Panamanian and Liberian registries, not simply 
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For example, consider the Liberian registry in 1996.84  Administered 
through a Virginia-based company, it was nearly completely open.85  
Liberia imposed no crew nationality requirements and granted tax 
subsidies to registered ships.86  Liberia almost certainly considered the 
registry a success: it generated 50-75% of the country’s annual 
revenues.87 
For their part, ship owners seek a comparative advantage.  In FOC 
registries, they can often minimize operating costs by exploiting low tax 
rates and labor costs.88  For example, Exxon estimated that it would cost 
78% less to operate a 28-man tanker from the Philippines than one from 
the United States.89  Low standards in areas such as pollution may also 
incentivize registrations of convenience, though the evidence is mixed.90  
In addition, the reduced likelihood of wartime conscription and the 
potential ability to avoid legal ramifications may influence ship owners’ 
registration decisions.91 
FOCs, with roots stretching at least to Roman times,92 have increased in 
importance in the last half-century.  After an ignominious role in the 
slave trade,93 their modern usage accelerated as post-World War I havens 
from U.S. efforts to build a strong merchant marine and impose domestic 
social reforms-like-prohibitions.94 United States-based shipping 
  
their existence, which clearly Panama and Liberia could not have anticipated when they began their 
registries.   
 84. It is unclear if Liberia’s registration requirements have changed since 1996.  Regardless, its 
dated procedures should be considered emblematic of the procedures in more emerging FOC 
countries today: as Liberia has gained prominence as a flagging country, other countries have 
assumed Liberia’s previous role as a minimum-requirement country.  DESOMBRE, supra note 81, at 
99.  For current registry requirements of different vessels, see Liberian Registry, Vessel Registration 
Procedures, www.liscr.com (under the “Maritime” tab choose “Vessel Registration Procedures”).    
 85. Anderson, supra note 57, at 155.  I hedge “nearly” because there was a toothless maximum 
size restriction for foreign-owned vessels that could be waived or circumvented by creating a paper 
corporation or partnership in Liberia. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Vessel Operations Under Flags of Convenience and Their Implications on National 
Security Before the Spec. Oversight Panel on the Merchant Marine of the H. Comm. on Armed 
Services, 107th Cong. 14 (2002) (Statement of Frank A.Wolf, Rep. of Va.) [hereinafterVessel 
Operations Under FOC].  
 88. Duruigbo, supra note 53, at 114. 
 89. Id. at 114 (citing L.F.E. Goldie, Environmental Catastrophes and Flags of Convenience – 
Does the Present Law Pose Speical Liability Issues?  3 PACE Y.B. INT’L L. 63, 73 n. 471 (1991)). 
 90. Duruigbo, supra note 53, at 114-15; see also infra notes 119-123, 146-49 and 
accompanying text. 
 91. Tina Shaughnessy & Ellen Tobin, Flags of Inconvenience: Freedom and Insecurity on the 
High Seas, 5 J. INT’L L. &POL’Y 15 (2006-07). 
 92. Frank L. Wiswall, Jr., Flags of Convenience, in UNITED STATES SHIPPING POLICIES AND 
THE WORLD MARKET 113 (William A. Lovett ed., 1996). 
 93. CARLISLE, supra note 83, at xiii. 
 94. Id. at 3. 
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companies greatly increased their use of open registries after World War 
II: ship owners were desperate to replace their war-ravaged merchant 
fleet without the burdens of the American tax and labor regimes.95  
Today, the International Transport Workers’ Federation, a seafarers’ 
trade union association, identifies thirty-two FOC countries.96  While this 
list reflects the association’s political agenda, that FOC vessels sail the 
high seas in large numbers is undeniable: countries accounting for 40% 
of tonnage – Panama, Liberia, and the Marshall Islands – are not among 
even the top thirty-five States of ownership.97 
VI. POTENTIAL CONCERNS ARISING FROM FLAGS OF 
CONVENIENCE  
This part addresses theoretical and experiential concerns with FOCs.  
Critics of the FOC regime include organized labor,98 environmentalists,99 
security experts,100 and traditional maritime nations.101  Section VI.A 
explains why critics allege that FOC States have low standards and 
toothless enforcement schemes.  Section VI.B amplifies the criticism that 
FOCs harm national security by depriving the domestic State of maritime 
surge capacity and by obfuscating ship ownership.  Section VI.C presents 
the objection that FOCs support human rights violators.  Section VI.D 
uses empirical data and incentive-based theories to offer an alternative 
viewpoint that FOCs are not objectionable and may actually represent a 
well-functioning market. 
A. STANDARDS AND ENFORCEMENT 
Critics vocally assert that FOC countries have low standards for ship 
work and life102 and fail to enforce even those.103  These shortcomings 
affect work conditions, worker safety, the environment and other natural 
  
 95. Id. at 110. 
 96. FOC Countries, INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT WORKERS’ FEDERATION, http://www. 
itfglobal.org/flags-convenience/flags-convenien-183.cfm (last visited March 18, 2013). 
 97. RMT, supra note 2, at 47.  40% of ships (by tonnage) are flagged in an FOC State but 
owned by a person in a non-FOC State. 
 98. See e.g., International Transport Workers’ Federation, Flags of Convenience Campaign, 
http://www.itfglobal.org/flags-convenience/index.cfm (“For 50 years the ITF, through its affiliated 
seafarers' and dockers' unions, has been waging a vigorous campaign against shipowners who 
abandon the flag of their own country in search of the cheapest possible crews and the lowest 
possible training and safety standards for their ships.”). 
 99. See, e.g., Duruigbo, supra note 53, at 115-17. 
 100. See, e.g., Vessel Operations Under FOC, supra note 87, at 79 (Statement of Paul J. Pluta, 
Rear Admiral, Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety and Environmental Protection, U.S. Coast 
Guard, Dep’t of Transp.). 
 101. Anderson, supra note 57, at 167.  See also infra notes 279-92 and accompanying text 
regarding the “genuine link” campaign. 
 102. Shaughnessy & Tobin, supra note 91, at 18-19, 21. 
 103. Tetley, supra note 41, at 174.  
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resources (such as fisheries), and safety on the seas.  They result from 
FOC States’ incentive structure, FOC States’ enforcement capabilities, 
and FOC vessels’ shipboard dynamics.   
From a theoretical perspective, critics claim that FOC States do not 
internalize the costs of low regulation and that this disjoint in 
expenditures widens the gulf between their and other States’ 
incentives.104  For example, landlocked States and States with little 
maritime commerce are not as affected by sea pollution and maritime 
accidents as coastal States.105  Consequently, they have little reason to 
regulate risky maritime behavior.106  Likewise, a State has no 
paternalistic incentive to protect its nationals when the ship owner, 
officer corps, and crew are foreign.107  Absent the normal costs of a lax 
regulatory State, nothing offsets FOC States’ preexisting pecuniary 
incentives.  Instead, avoiding the expenses of regulating – such as 
operating a coast guard and administrative structure108 – and attracting 
vessels and their associated revenues dominate FOC States’ decisions 
regarding implementation and enforcement of regulations.109  A 1989 
study seemingly confirmed critics’ nightmarish predictions: it found that 
flag States acted on just 17% of foreign referrals for standard 
violations.110 
Critics additionally allege that ship owners can escape enforcement in 
FOC States.  First, ship owners in FOC States may be more difficult to 
identify than in closed registries.111  Even once identified, owners’ ability 
to hide behind new corporate identities hinders sustained tracking and 
enforcement.112  Even if owners and other key personnel are identified 
and tracked, they may be able to avoid personal jurisdiction by not 
visiting the flag State.113  They may also refuse to testify, seemingly 
without penalty.114 
  
 104. Duruigbo, supra note 53, at 108. 
 105. See Shaughnessy & Tobin, supra note 91, at 20. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Duruigbo, supra note 53, at 108. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. (citing RONALD MITCHELL, INTENTIONAL OIL POLLUTION AT SEA: ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY AND TREATY COMPLIANCE 163 (The MIT Press, 1994)). 
 111. Anderson, supra note 57, at 164 (citing United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development [UNCTAD], Action on the Question of Open Registries, TD/B/C.4/220 (1981)). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id.  Cf.FED. R. CIV. P. 12. 
 114. Anderson, supra note 57, at 164 (citing UNCTAD, supra note 111).  Notice that even a 
damaged relationship with the flag State probably does not serve as a barrier since owners can 
reflag. 
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Critics also claim that FOC vessels lack the shipboard dynamics to self-
regulate. -On issues ranging from safety to living standards to 
environmental stewardship, ship owners can pressure shipboard officers; 
they, in turn, can manhandle the crew.115  Since officers and crew work, 
facing the reality that they can be replaced at the next port, neither can 
effectively request flag country help116 or union protection.117 
Critics point to anecdotal incidents as evidence of FOC States’ unsafe 
records.  For example, the Deepwater Horizon rig and the Rena container 
ship referred to in this paper’s introduction118 were registered in 
traditional FOC countries, the Marshall Islands119 and Liberia,120 
respectively.  Investigations generally attribute accidents such as these to 
a lax regulatory scheme and untrained crews.121 
For example, the 1978 Amoco Cadiz oil spill dramatically illustrates the 
origins of an FOC vessel and the factors that can lead to a maritime 
disaster.  Eight years prior, Amoco incorporated in Indiana and 
contracted with a Spain-based shipbuilder to construct a supertanker.122  
Representatives from Amoco and the American Bureau of Shipping 
(ABS)123 classification society were on-site in Spain during the ship’s 
four-year construction.124 A wholly-owned Amoco subsidiary 
incorporated in Liberia accepted delivery of the Amoco Cadiz and 
presently sold it to another Liberian Amoco subsidiary, this one with 
Bermuda as its principal place of business.125 
In the ensuing years, ABS periodically inspected and approved the 
Amoco Cadiz.126  In 1978, on charter to Shell,127 the Amoco Cadiz loaded 
  
 115. Anderson, supra note 57, at 164. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See supra notes 5, 6. 
 119. Angel Gonzalez, New Gulf Spill Report Points to Missed Signs, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18, 
2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903596904576514281511893242.html. 
 120. Press Release, Liberian Registry, Liberian Registry Cooperating Fully in Rena Salvage 
(Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/BU1110/S00369/liberian-registry-co-operating-
fully-in-rena-salvage.htm. 
 121. Anderson, supra note 57, at 162. 
 122. In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d 1279, 1285-86 (7th Cir. Ill. 1992). 
 123. The American Bureau of Shipping is a classification society that, among other activities, 
ensures vessels’ designs comply with their standards.  Id. at 1286. See also Am. Bureau of Shipping, 
What We Do, www.eagle.org (follow the “About ABS” tab to “What We Do”).  It is one of thirteen 
members of the prestigious International Association of Classification Societies.  Int’l Ass’n of 
Classification Soc’ys, IACS Explained, http://www.iacs.org.uk/Explained/members.aspx.  See also 
DESOMBRE,supra note 81, at 183. 
 124. Amoco Cadiz, supra note 122, at 1286. 
 125. Id. at 1287. 
 126. Id. 
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crude oil in the Arabian Gulf, destined for the Netherlands.128  Its Italian 
crew was experienced, its officers licensed, and all had participated in 
land and sea exercises.129  The Amoco Cadiz’s steering gear failed nine 
miles off of the French coast: the aircraft carrier-sized supertanker was, 
in maritime parlance, “not under command.”130  A German salvage 
tugboat responded, though her operations were delayed while the Amoco 
Cadiz captain called Chicago for permission to contract with the tug.131  
The tug’s efforts were ultimately futile: the Amoco Cadiz crashed against 
rocks, split in two, and dumped oil covering 144 square miles of ocean.132 
The trial court determined that the proximate causes of the steering 
failure were Amoco’s failure to maintain the gear, train the crew, provide 
back-up steering, and notice that the steering construction deviated from 
the design specifications.133  In reviewing the substandard State of the 
steering gear and its maintenance, the circuit court rhetorically asked, 
“Why did these deficiencies occur?  The record is replete with references 
to the fact that it was Amoco’s deliberate policy to defer drydocking and 
repairs in order to minimize the loss of charter hire that would be 
incurred by taking the ship out of service.”134 Amoco Cadiz illustrates the 
main grievance against FOCs: their ships do not strictly follow requisite 
safety regulations. 
B. NATIONAL SECURITY 
FOC critics also lament that foreign registries deprive home States of 
critical national defense flexibility135 and complicate homeland defense 
activities.  A flag State can conscript and requisition its registered vessels 
in a time of crisis.136  Every vessel that moves abroad for flagging, then, 
reduces this emergency capacity.  In addition, the merchant marine is 
critical to war efforts abroad.137  In 1985, the United States Joint Chiefs 
  
 127. Ship chartering is a common business model in which the charterer contracts for the use of 
the vessel.  Of import here, Amoco retained responsibility for the ship’s nautical and technical 
operation.  Cf. Amoco Cadiz, supra note 122. 
 128. Amoco Cadiz, supra note 122, at 1287. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 1288. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 1295 (citing In re Oil Spill by the AMOCO CADIZ Off the Coast of France on March 
16, 1978, 1984 American Maritime Cases 2123, 2173-88, 2194 (N.D. Ill. 1984)). 
 134. Amoco Cadiz, supra note 122, at 1299. 
 135. See e.g.,Vessel Operations Under FOC, supra note 87, at 25 (Statement of Schubert, 
Captain, U.S. Mar. Admin., Dep’t of Transp.). 
 136. RIENOW, supra note 42, at 5, 7. 
 137. Lovett, supra note 92, at 57 (discussing private sealift’s importance in the Allied WWII 
victory); see also Anderson, supra note 57, 21 TUL. MAR. L. J. at 144 (discussing the same in the 
Falkland’s War). 
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of Staff estimated that in the event of an overseas conflict, 95% of 
deploying forces and equipment would be transported by sea,138 and 
surely merchant mariners would conduct a large portion of this sealift.  
In the recent Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns, United States-flagged 
commercial vessels carried 60% of military cargo.139  While foreign-
flagged ships can provide this capacity, critics are concerned about their 
allegiance to the United States. 
In addition, the anonymity of FOC ship owners hinders homeland 
security.  Corporate veneers and forged identifications obscure Coast 
Guards’ abilities to monitor who is visiting ports.140  Further, critics argue 
that FOC masters do not responsibly guard against dangerous cargo.141  
Therefore, FOC vessels could be used to stage a terrorist attack142 or to 
traffic in illicit goods.143 
C. HUMAN RIGHTS 
Critics additionally aver that FOC registrations are objectionable on 
human rights grounds because their proceeds may support detestable 
regimes.  For example, vessel registry fees allegedly provided substantial 
income for Charles Taylor’s regime in Liberia.144For thoroughness, this 
paper acknowledges Human Rights as a consideration for critiquing FOC 
registrations. However, further elaboration of this issue is outside the 
scope of this paper.  
D. CONTRASTING VIEWPOINTS IN SUPPORT OF FOC REGISTRIES 
On the other hand, some observers defend FOC registries.  They point to 
a functioning market that provides cheap transportation and data 
suggesting that FOC States are not racing to the regulatory bottom.  They 
also note that international mechanisms ameliorate many of the critics’ 
concerns. 
Defenders assert that the observed variety in registry schemes results 
from the market catering to the diverse needs of different ship owners, as 
  
 138. Wallace C. Reed, U.S. Sealift and Nat’l Sec, in U.S. SHIPPING POLICIES AND THE WORLD 
MARKET, supra note 92, at 261. 
 139. Status of U.S.-Flagged Vessels in U.S.-Foreign Trade Before the Transp. And 
Infrastructure Comm, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of John Reinhart, Chairman and CEO Maersk 
Line Limited), http://transportation.house.gov/hearings/hearingdetail.aspx?NewsID=921 [video]. 
 140. Vessel Operations Under FOC, supra note 87, at 30-86 (statement of Pluta and Schubert). 
 141. Vessel Operations Under FOC, supra note 87, at 79 (statement of Pluta). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Vessel Operations Under FOC, supra note 87, at 103 (statement of Alex Vines, Senior 
Researcher, Human Rights Watch). 
 144. Vessel Operations Under FOC, supra note 87, at 14 (statement of Wolf). 
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opposed to a race to the bottom.145 Based on this line of thought, the flag 
State, then, may not actually drive standards; instead, internal corporate 
culture and mechanisms are determinative. This market clearing 
contributes to low transportation costs, which are passed on to 
consumers. 
There is also data that critics are off the mark.  Open registries have, on 
average, younger vessels.146  Since older ships tend to be in greater States 
of disrepair, this is inconsistent with the belief that ship owners flock to 
FOC States in pursuit of low safety standards.  Similarly, an empirical 
study found that vessels approved by respected classification societies 
are more likely to fly an FOC flag.147  Anecdotally, the Amoco Cadiz148 
hardly looks like FOC abuse when examined through a different lens: 
although it was Liberian-flagged, Amoco hired a premier classification 
society to oversee construction and conduct periodic checks, and it 
employed licensed and trained seafarers.  In fact, Liberia employs a large 
team of inspectors and has a reputation for safety.149  In contrast, the 
Exxon Valdez tanker responsible for the 1989 oil catastrophe near Alaska 
– one of the largest oil spills in history – was United States-flagged.150 
Lastly, defenders note that the international community can and has 
taken steps to reduce the potentially harmful effects of FOC States.  
These precautions include port and coastal State control, international 
agreements, domestic shipping protections, financial penalties, and 
registry requirements.  This next section discusses the various 
international law bases of jurisdiction on which these mitigation 
measures are based and then turns more specifically to exploring these 
responses by the international community. 
VII. BASES OF JURISDICTION OTHER THAN THE FLAG OF 
CONVENIENCE 
As discussed earlier, the law of the flag is of “cardinal importance” and 
the internationally recognized starting point in maritime choice of 
law.151There are, though, occasions for concurrent jurisdiction.  This 
  
 145. See RMT, supra note 2, at 41 (“Different registries specialize in different vessel types”); 
see also DESOMBRE, supra note 81, at 46. 
 146. RMT, supra note 2, at 40-41. 
 147. Jan Hoffman, Ricardo J. Sanchez, and Wayne K. Talley, Determinants of Vessel Flag, in 
SHIPPING ECONOMICS 185 (Kevin Cullinane ed., 2005). 
 148. Amoco Cadiz, supra note 122. 
 149. DESOMBRE, supra note 81, at 98; see also Julie A. Perkins, Ship Registers: An 
International Update, 22 TUL. MAR. L. J. 198 (1997-98). 
 150. Duruigbo, supra, note 53, at 117. 
 151. Lauritzen, supra note 11, at 585. 
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section explores these alternate bases of extraterritorial jurisdiction, 
specifically with reference to their application in maritime law.   
The Restatement (Third) of International Conflicts divides jurisdiction 
into three types: jurisdiction to prescribe, to adjudicate, and to enforce.152  
Prescription grants a State jurisdiction to apply its laws to people and 
situations.153  Adjudicative jurisdiction is the ability to subject people to a 
State’s courts.154  Enforcement allows jurisdiction to punish 
noncompliance.155 
This section of the paper focuses on jurisdiction to prescribe and 
jurisdiction of States to regulate FOCs beyond the law of the flag regime.  
Enforcement jurisdiction always exists when there is jurisdiction to 
prescribe.156  International law recognizes jurisdiction to prescribe in six 
circumstances: Section VII.A discusses the three concepts of the 
territoriality principle; Section VII.B looks at the tenuous nationality 
principle; Section VII.C explains the protective principle; Section VII.D 
discusses the limited universal jurisdiction principle; Section VII.E takes 
a look at the weak passive personality principle; and Section VII.F 
considers flag State permission.  Additionally, Section VII.G examines 
the trump of State sovereignty, which is independent of international law.  
Section VII.H discusses the choice of law questions resulting from 
concurrent international jurisdiction.  Part VIII then applies these 
concepts to the FOC challenge. 
Some jurisdictional bases are more tenuous than others; consequently, 
jurisdictional claims can be strengthened by having more than one basis 
for jurisdiction.157  As Section VII.H further discusses, a State should 
decline jurisdiction where it would be unreasonable.158 
A. TERRITORIALITY PRINCIPLE 
The least controversial and most common basis of jurisdiction to 
prescribe and enforce is the territoriality principle.159  Territoriality 
  
 152. RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 401.  International law cases are referenced through this 
source. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. § 431. 
 157. Id. § 401, Comments a, b. 
 158. Id. § 401, Comment a, §403. 
 159. Id. § 402, Comment c. 
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encompasses three independent concepts: territorial conduct, territorial 
presence, and territorial effects.160 
Under territorial conduct, a State can prescribe laws regarding “conduct 
that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its territory.”161  The 
law of the flag arose naturally from this principle, because a vessel was 
considered part of the flag State’s territory.  For example, the Supreme 
Court relied on the territorial principle and law of the flag in exercising 
jurisdiction over a murder committed aboard a United States-flagged 
vessel at port in the Belgian Congo.162  The law of the flag survived 
shedding the fallacy of vessels as a literal part of a State’s territory, and 
today scholars are divided on whether it is an exercise of territorial 
jurisdiction or an independent jurisdiction.163  The uniformity of this 
principle, though appealing, is also constraining.  
Under the territorial presence concept, a State can prescribe laws 
regarding “the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its 
territory.”164  Therefore, vessels in foreign ports are subject to the port 
State’s concurrent jurisdiction.  The U.S. Supreme Court annunciated the 
rationale for this principle in the Wildenhus’s Case.  The Court noted that 
a vessel voluntarily enters a foreign port and seeks port State protection 
during its stay.165  The Court continued that any other system “would be 
obviously inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would subject the 
laws to continual infraction, and the government to degradation.”166  
Consequently, “when a merchant vessel of one country enters the ports 
of another for the purposes of trade, it subjects itself to the law of the 
place to which it goes.”167  Decades earlier, in a letter to England, United 
States Secretary of State Webster similarly argued, “any unlawful acts 
done by [a vessel] while thus lying in [a foreign] port, and for all 
contracts entered into while there . . . [she] must, doubtless, be 
answerable to the laws of the place.”168  He simultaneously affirmed, 
“[flag State] jurisdiction is preserved over the vessels even in parts of the 
  
 160. Id. § 402. 
 161. Id.Cf. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. [Aramco], 499 U.S. 
244, 248 (“It is a longstanding principle of American law 'that legislation of Congress, unless a 
contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States.'" (internal citation omitted). However, Congress has since expanded the scope of legislation). 
 162. United Sates v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 155-56 (1933). 
 163. RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, §402 Comment h (advocating that vessel regulation at sea is 
an independent jurisdictional basis but acknowledging that some view it as part of territorial 
jurisdiction). 
 164. Id. § 402. 
 165. Wildenhus’s Case, 120 U.S. 1, 11 (1887). 
 166. Id. (quoting The Exchange, 7 Cranch. 116, 144 (1812)). 
 167. Wildenhus’s Case, supra note 166. 
 168. Rodgers, supra note 29, at 264-65. 
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sea subject to a foreign dominion.”169  This next section of the paper 
returns to the choice of law question that obviously arises.170 
Under the territorial effects principle, a State can prescribe laws 
regarding “conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have 
substantial effect within its territory.”171  Potentially nearly boundless, the 
effects principle is generally limited to cases of substantial effect.172  It is 
not widely applied in the maritime context.  In one of the few U.S. 
maritime cases relying on the territorial effects principle, the Third 
Circuit upheld drug-related charges against foreigners apprehended on 
the high seas aboard a Panamanian ship.173  Although the U.S. Coast 
Guard intercepted the ship in international waters, the defendants were 
convicted under U.S. statutes of possession with unlawful intent to 
import marijuana, conspiracy to import marijuana, and possession with 
intent to distribute marijuana.174  Of central importance, the trial court 
found that the smugglers were heading for the United States, thus 
providing a substantial domestic effect.175  Of note, the Circuit Court 
actually expanded the traditional effects principle: it found that 
international law permitted extraterritorial jurisdiction if effects are 
intended to be domestic,176 even if they are not consummated.177  Such 
jurisdiction was reasonable, the court found, because the domestic effect 
was foreseeable, other States had an interest in regulating this activity, 
and there was no comity concern.178 
There are few other United States maritime cases relying on territorial 
effects.  The Eleventh Circuit recognized the effects principle as a basis 
of maritime jurisdiction in dicta, though it relied only on the Restatement 
(Second) of Foreign Relations,179 Supreme and Appellate Courts 
  
 169. Id. at 264. 
 170. See infra notes 213-241 and accompanying text.  Cf. Symeon Symeonides, Symposium on 
Choice of Law and Admiralty: Maritime Conflicts of Law From the Perspective of Modern Choice  
of Law Methodology, 7 TUL. MAR. L. J. 223, 224 (1982) (“[T]here is hardly any area of conflicts law 
. . . where governments are more immediately interested in the outcome of litigation between the 
private parties than in the maritime context.”) 
 171. RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 402. 
 172. Id. § 402, comment d. 
 173. United States v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161, 165-66 (3d Cir. N.J. 1986). 
 174. Id. at 166. 
 175. Id. at 169. 
 176. Id. at 168 (citing RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 402). 
 177. Wright-Barker, supra note 174, at 167 (citing Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 
(1911); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18 
(1965)). 
 178. Wright-Barker, supra note 174, at 168. 
 179. Marino-Garcia, supra note 43, at 1382 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS, supra note 178, § 18). 
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decisions in non-maritime cases,180 and appellate decisions in maritime 
cases involving conspiracy.181  It has also been applied to a human 
smuggling prosecution182 and to documents forged to conceal an oil 
discharge.183 
B. NATIONALITY PRINCIPLE 
The nationality principle, or jurisdiction of “activities, interests, status, or 
relations of its nationals outside as well as within its territory,”184 is an 
exceptional jurisdictional basis that may need to be bolstered with an 
additional basis. 
The U.S. Supreme Court in part relied on the nationality principle when 
it upheld a Florida State court’s conviction of an American deep-sea 
diver for illegally removing sponges in the Gulf of Mexico.185  The Court 
dismissed the defendant’s central contention that Florida impermissibly 
applied its laws outside of State jurisdiction: “the United States is not 
debarred by any rule of international law from governing the conduct of 
its own citizens upon the high seas or even in foreign countries when the 
rights of other nations or their nationals are not infringed.”186  The Court 
supplemented the defendant’s American nationality with a version of the 
territoriality effects principle in holding, “Thus, a criminal statute dealing 
with acts that are directly injurious to the government and are capable of 
perpetration without regard to particular locality, is to be construed as 
applicable to citizens of the United States upon the high seas or in a 
foreign country.”187  This case is one of many that shows how U.S. courts 
must supplement their decision when applying the nationality principal. 
  
 180. Marino-Garcia, supra note 43, at 1382 (citing Strassheim, supra note 178, at 285); United 
States v. Baker 609 F.2d, 134, 138 (5th Cir. Fla. 1980); Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882 (5th 
Cir. Tex. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 884 (1967)). 
 181. Marino-Garcia, supra note 43, at 1382 (citing United States v. Gray, 659 F.2d 1296, 1298 
(5th Cir. Tex.1981); United States v. DeWeese, 632 F.2d 1267, 1271 (5th Cir. Fla. 1980), cert. 
denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981); United States v. Ricardo, 619 F.2d 1124, 1129 (5th Cir. Texas 1980), 
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1063 (1981)). 
 182. United States v. Best, 172 F. Supp. 2d 656, 661 (D.V.I. 2001) (holding that the effects 
principle grants subject matter jurisdiction but dismissing the human trafficking indictment due to 
lack of personal jurisdiction); United States v. Viegers, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16122 *4 (D.V.I. 
1994). 
 183. United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, LTD., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1364 (S.D. Fla. 
1998).  This was a particularly liberal application of the domestic effects principle: the court found a 
domestic effect in undermining the U.S. Coast Guard. 
 184. RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 402 Comment b. 
 185. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 69-70 (1941). 
 186. Id. at 73 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 187. Id. at 73-74 (citations omitted). 
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C. PROTECTIVE PRINCIPLE 
The protective principle enables a State to prescribe laws with respect to 
conduct “directed against the security of the State or against a limited 
class of other State interests.”188  Reachable conduct is restricted to the 
limited class of offenses “that are generally recognized as crimes by 
developed legal systems,” such as espionage, counterfeiting, official 
document falsification, perjury, and immigration violations.189 
In the maritime context, courts often discuss this principle with respect to 
the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, which criminalizes drug 
possession on “a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”190  
Congress specifically stated in the Act that drug trafficking is universally 
condemned and threatens U.S. security.191  In the cases reviewed for this 
paper, courts maintained only in dicta that the protective principle could 
be a basis of jurisdiction;192 they instead relied on flag country permission 
to find jurisdiction.193 
D. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION PRINCIPLE 
Under universal jurisdiction, a State may prescribe laws regarding 
“certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal 
concern.”194  These offenses, such as piracy, slave trade, genocide, and 
war crimes,195196 are determined by customary and positive international 
law, and are evidenced by a universal condemnation and desire to 
control; there need not be any other link.197  For example, United States 
  
 188. RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, §402. 
 189. Id. § 402, Comment f. 
 190. United States v. Vilches-Navarrete, 523 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. P.R. 2008) (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 
70503(a)(1)). 
 191. United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 553 (1st Cir. P.R. 1999) (quoting 46 U.S.C. app. 
§ 1902). 
 192. See e.g., Vilches-Navarrete, supra note 191, at 21-22 (Lynch, J., concurring); United States 
v. Gonzales, 311 F.3d 440, 446 (1st Cir. P.R. 2002) (Torruella, J., concurring); Cardales, supra note 
192, at 553. 
 193. Vilches-Navarrete, supra note 191, at 11; Cardales, supra note 192, at 553. 
 194. RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 404. 
 195. Id. § 404, Comment a. 
 196. It is the author’s contention that there is no universally accepted list of what crime 
constitutes a universal concern. It has been proposed that the United Nations has a specific list of 
crimes that would be of a universal concern, including: piracy, slavery, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, torture, and genocide. However, it can be argued on the contrary that not all parties would 
agree to the UN’s “universal” list. For the UN’s universal list, please see, 
http://www.amicc.org/docs/Universal%20Jurisdiction%20Q&A.pdf. 
 197. RESTATEMENT, supra note 20,§ 404. 
150
23
Powell: Flags of Convenience
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2013
286 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT’L & COMP. LAW [Vol. XIX 
Supreme Court Chief Justice Marshall stated that pirates can be 
prosecuted by any State.198 
Although this principle is well settled as a jurisdictional basis, defining 
its contours is contentious.  The standard is so high that even terrorist 
activities are not prescribed under this jurisdiction.199  Consider the 
criteria the United States First Circuit used in declining to hold drug 
trafficking as a universal offense: it is neither an “attack on the 
international legal order”200 nor “‘so inhumane, so shocking to the 
conscience, that it makes all jurisdictional’ considerations irrelevant.”201 
This surprising case holding is just one example of the difficulty in 
applying this principal. 
E. PASSIVE PERSONALITY PRINCIPLE 
Under the passive personality principle, a State may prescribe laws if the 
victim is a national of that State.202  It is a tenuous basis for jurisdiction203 
and consequently is often coupled with another jurisdictional basis or 
additional jurisdictional hooks. 
For example, the United States Ninth Circuit sustained a conviction 
against a St. Vincent and the Grenadines citizen for sexual contact with 
an American minor aboard a Panamanian-flagged cruise ship in Mexican 
waters.204  In finding jurisdiction, the court relied heavily on both the 
victim’s nationality and the cruise ship’s other United States contacts: it 
departed from and returned to a California port.205 
  
 198. United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. 144, 152 (1820).  While this pronouncement was 
arguably dicta, the Court considered it binding in a case later in the same term.  United States v. 
Holmes, 18 U.S. 412, 416 (1820). 
 199. United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 107 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2003); RESTATEMENT, supra note 
20, § 404, Comment a. 
 200. United States v. Cardales-Luna, 632 F.3d 731, 746 (1st Cir. P.R. 2011) (U. PENN. PRESS, 
NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, 178-
79 (Stephen Macedo ed. 2004)). 
 201. Cardales-Luna, 632 F.3d 731, 746 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Eugene Kontorovich, Beyond 
the Article I Horizon: Congress's Enumerated Powers and Universal Jurisdiction over Drug Crimes, 
93 MINN. L. REV. 1191, 1226 (2009)).  But cf. United States v. Estupinan, 453 F.3d 1336, 1339 
(11th Cir. Fla. 2006) (suggesting that drug trafficking is universally condemned). 
 202. RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 402, Comment g. 
 203. See Marino-Garcia, supra note 43, at 1382 n.15 (“The [passive] principle, however, has 
generally not been accepted in this country as a basis for jurisdiction.” (citations omitted)); United 
States v. Neil, 312 F.3d 419, 423 (9th Cir. Cal. 2002) (“[I]n general, the passive personality principle 
has not been accepted as a sufficient basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction over ordinary torts and 
crimes.” (citations omitted)). 
 204. Neil, supra note 203, at 420.  
 205. Id. at 422. 
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F. FLAG STATE PERMISSION 
A State may board a foreign ship on the high seas if the flag State grants 
permission.206  In some circumstances, the boarding State may even apply 
its domestic law.207  This appears to be an outgrowth of the principle that 
a State may bind itself by agreement.208 
For instance, in the Cardales-Luna case, Venezuela authorized the U.S. 
Coast Guard to board and apply United States law to a Venezuelan vessel 
150 miles south of Puerto Rico.209  Upon finding marijuana aboard, the 
foreign crew was apprehended and charged with violating the Maritime 
Drug Law Enforcement Act.210  The defendants contested that the Act did 
not provide jurisdiction over them, because they had no nexus with the 
United States.  The court disagreed that due process or international law 
was violated because “the flag nation's consent eliminates any concern 
that the application of United States law may be arbitrary or 
fundamentally unfair.”211 
G. STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
Some jurists and scholars further argue that Congress can reach overseas, 
even in the absence of an enumerated basis, so long as it acts in 
accordance with the Constitution.212 For example, Justice Scalia in his 
dissent recognized this Congressional power in writing, “[t]hough it 
clearly has constitutional authority to do so, Congress is generally 
presumed not to have exceeded those customary international-law limits 
on jurisdiction to prescribe.”213 Some also claim an analog to this 
  
 206. RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 522.  See also United States v. Suerte, 291 F.3d 366, 375-
76 (5th Cir. Tex. 2002) (holding that as a matter of “generally accepted international law” a flag 
State can invite another State’s jurisdiction). 
 207. See Cardales-Luna, supra note 200, at 553; United States v. Robinson, 843 F.2d 1, 4 (1st 
Cir. Mass. 1988) (holding that because international agreement can be the basis of extraterritorial 
legal prescription, State authorization to apply foreign law to its vessel is legitimate). 
 208. See, e.g., The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 135 (1812) (“All exceptions, 
therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its own territories, must be traced up to 
the consent of the nation itself.”). 
 209. Cardales-Luna, supra note 200, at 552. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Suerte, supra note 206, at 371 (citations omitted). 
 212. Congress would have to expressly declare this intention to avoid the long-standing canon 
of construction which dictates reading statutes as complying with international law.  Lauritzen, 
supra note 11, at 578 (referencing Marshall, C.J., in The Charming Betsy, 2 U.S. 64, 118 (1804)). 
 213. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 815 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting in 
part) (emphasis added) (neither the majority nor the dissent relied on this Congressional authority).  
Accord United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 1052, 1056 (3d Cir. V.I. 1993) (“There is, of 
course, no doubt the Congress may override international law by clearly expressing its intent to do 
so.”); United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340, 1343 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (“An American 
statute may override international law, but only when Congress has expressed the clear intent to 
supersede the existing law of nations.” (citations omitted)). 
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sovereignty: the Court has asserted that maritime law has no domestic 
force unless it is accepted by the United States.214 
H. CHOICE OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 
Differences between territorial jurisdiction and the law of the flag 
necessarily present a conflict of laws.  In evaluating a statute to 
determine if a different jurisdictional basis should apply, U.S. courts look 
to Congressional intent and principles of international law.  Courts first 
evaluate if Congress intended for a statute to apply extraterritorially.  If 
so, courts inquire if Congress intended to contravene the law of nations215 
or more narrowly to go to the limits of international law.  When 
Congressional intent is clear, the analysis is simplified.  When 
Congressional intent is not easily discernible, the courts look to 
principles of international law.  
When Congressional intent to exceed international law is clear, courts 
often recognize its right to do so.  Broadly, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
declared, “When it desires to do so, Congress knows how to place the 
high seas within the jurisdictional reach of a statute.”216  More 
specifically, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act extends U.S. jurisdiction 
to “[e]very bill of lading or similar document of title which is evidence 
of a contract for the carriage of goods by sea to or from ports of the 
United States, in foreign trade.”217  The Fifth Circuit presumptively 
applied this Act: “We have no difficulty in finding the threshold 
jurisdictional requirement” to a flagless barge218 that sank on an internal 
waterway between German ports219 and had a bill of lading opting for 
Belgian law.220  The barge was ultimately destined for a “mother ship” 
that would transport it to New Orleans.221Although applying the Carriage 
of Goods by Sea Act to this situation almost certainly exceeded 
  
 214. Lauritzen, supra note 11, at 578 (“ “The law of the sea,” we have had occasion to observe, 
is in a peculiar sense an international law, but application of its specific rules depends upon 
acceptance by the United States.” quoting Farrell v United States, 336 U.S. 511, 517 (1949)). 
 215. Hartford Fire, supra note 213, at 813-15 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 216. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 440 (1989).  The 
Court cited three such examples of extraterritorial intent: 14 U.S.C. § 89(a), which permits Coast 
Guard seizure of vessels on the high seas; 18 U.S.C. § 7, which extends criminal jurisdiction over 
U.S. vessels to the high seas; and 19 U.S.C. § 1701, which permits the President to establish 
customs-enforcement areas on the high seas.  Id. at 440, n.7. 
 217. Wirth, Ltd. V. S/S Acadia Forest, 537 F.2d 1272, 1275 n.6 (5th Cir. La. 1976) (quoting 46 
U.S.C.A. § 13000). 
 218. Id. at 1279.  A significant matter for the litigation was whether this particular type of barge 
should be considered a ship and required to have a flag. 
 219. Id. at 1275. 
 220. Id. at 1275 n.6. 
 221. Id. at 1278. 
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international law,222 the court seemingly found Congress’s intent to do so 
clear.   
The U.S. Supreme Court has also upheld application of United States law 
to foreign ships’ internal matters while in U.S. ports, traditionally an area 
for flag State jurisdiction.223  The Seaman’s Act of March 4, 1915, 
applies wage payment provisos to “seamen on foreign vessels while in 
harbors of the United States.”224  When a British seafarer invoked the Act 
against his British ship despite his British contract, the Court found that 
Congress’s purpose was “to place American and foreign seamen on an 
equality of right in so far as the privileges of this section are 
concerned.”225  Therefore, the Court subjected the British ship to the 
Seaman’s Act.226 
Similarly, courts have heeded Congress’s desire that the Limitation of 
Liability Act apply to “the owner of any vessel whether American or 
foreign.”227  Although this statute often runs into direct conflict with 
foreign law, courts apply it to incidents lacking any American connection 
beyond a port of call.228  Courts have additionally extended Congress’s 
extraterritorial intent to seamen’s rights229 and drug trafficking with no 
U.S. nexus.230 
When Congressional intent is unclear, canon of construction compels 
that a statute be read as consistent with international law.231  Courts must 
also evaluate international law’s boundaries when Congress intends to 
reach, but not exceed, the limits of international law.  In the maritime 
context, that analysis of international law is guided by “the needs of a 
general federal maritime law and with due recognition of our self-
regarding respect for the relevant interests of foreign nations in the 
regulation of maritime commerce as part of the legitimate concern of the 
international community.”232 
  
 222. Id. at 1282-83. 
 223. See infra notes 231-43 and accompanying text: the holistic reasonableness test described 
below. 
 224. Strathearn S.S. v. Dillon, 252 U.S. 348, 353 (1920). 
 225. Id. at 353. 
 226. Id. at 355. 
 227. Symeonides, supra note 171, at 230-31 (quoting 46 U.S.C. §183(a) (1976)). 
 228. Id. at 234. 
 229. See infra note 310 and accompanying text discussing the Jones Act. 
 230. See supra notes 189-190 discussing Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act. 
 231. Hartford Fire, supra note 213, at 815 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 232. Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 382-83 (1959). 
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The Restatement and court opinions are illustrative of what 
considerations inform this analysis.  The Restatement conditions 
jurisdiction on an all-inclusive reasonability constraint.233  Relevant 
criteria include: the locus of the offense and its effects, other connections 
such as offender or victim nationality, the relative importance of the 
regulation to the State or to the international system, the existence of 
individual expectations and international traditions, and the likelihood of 
interstate conflict.234 
The U.S. Supreme Court in Lauritzen v. Larsen delineated similar factors 
when it considered a Danish seaman’s suit against a Danish-flagged 
vessel for a tort suffered near Cuba.235  The only connection with the 
United States was that the seaman signed his employment contract in 
New York.236  By its terms, the Jones Act237 included United States 
jurisdiction over maritime torts that occur anywhere, but it was unclear if 
Congress actually intended for such broad extraterritorial application in 
violation of international law.238  The Court, mindful of “considerations 
of comity, reciprocity and long-range interest,”239 considered the place of 
the wrongful act, the flag, the victim’s domicile, the offender’s domicile, 
the place of contract, the accessibility of a foreign forum, and the law of 
the forum.240  Ultimately, the Court concluded that domestic jurisdiction 
would be unreasonable.241  The Lauritzen factors, though neither 
exhaustive nor mechanical,242 continue to guide maritime choice of 
law.243 
  
 233. RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 403.  See also Hartford Fire, supra note 213, at 818 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (relying on § 403 to evaluate the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act). 
 234. RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 403. 
 235. Lauritzen, supra note 11, at 573. 
 236. Id. 
 237. “Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his 
election, maintain an action for damages at law.” 46 U.S.C. § 688 (revised as 46 U.S.C. § 30104) 
quoted in Lauritzen, supra note 11, at 582 (emphasis added). 
 238. Lauritzen, supra note 11, at 577-78. 
 239. Id. at 582. 
 240. Id. at 583-91. 
 241. Id. at 592-93. 
 242. Hellenic Lines v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 308-09 (1970).Cf. Romero, supra note 232, at 
382-83 (“These [choice of law] principles do not depend upon a mechanical application of a doctrine 
like that of lex loci delicticommissi.”). 
 243. Lauritzen, supra note 11, at 573, 581 (explaining that the choice of law question is guided 
by “the usual doctrine and practices of maritime law”).  See Hartford Fire, supra note 213, at 820-22 
(citing Lauritzen as in accord with RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 403); Romero, supra note 232, at 
382 (“The broad principles of choice of law and the applicable criteria of selection set forth in 
Lauritzen were intended to guide courts in the application of maritime law generally.” (citing 
Lauritzen, supra note 11, at 577)).  See also Symeonides, supra note 171, at 238.  Some courts 
consider an eighth factor.  See infra notes 301-305 and accompanying text. 
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VIII. EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN ORDER OF THE SEAS  
FOC States will remain a significant part of global commerce.  Their 
potential to disrupt the fragile maritime order is unambiguous, though 
experientially, their impact is mixed.  The international community’s 
response to FOC registrations has probably been a significant factor in 
maintaining order.  This section reviews what these responses have been 
and how else the international community could use international law to 
avert FOC vessels’ potential abuses. 
Section VIII.A discusses port State’s responses to FOCs.  Section VIII.B 
explores coastal State responses to FOCs. Section VIII.C studies 
international efforts to create minimum registry requirements. Section 
VIII.D considers international agreements designed to maintain maritime 
order. Section VIII.E discusses the utility of universal jurisdiction in 
maintaining maritime order. Section VIII.F examines the litigation 
remedy provided by lifting the corporate veil.  Section VIII.G reviews 
States’ use of the nationality principle to reach blameworthy actors.  
Section VIII.H considers States’ programs to encourage domestic 
shipping.  Finally, Section VIII.I discusses States’ prerogative to 
contravene international law. 
A. PORT STATE CONTROL 
Port States, acting under the territorial presence principle, inspect foreign 
ships visiting their ports.  Precedent suggests that jurisdiction is limited 
to matters that affect the port, as opposed to those that are purely internal 
to the ship.  Although this port State control is a highly relevant factor in 
maintaining shipping standards – one author calls it “the most effective 
cure of the malaise of the maritime industry”244 – it has its limitations. 
A vessel’s voluntary entrance into a foreign port subjects it to that port’s 
laws under the territorial presence principle.245  However, courts have 
eschewed such broad application because of its deleterious effects on 
commerce.246  Instead, jurisdiction remains with the flag State unless the 
vessel’s master or flag State requests intervention, the port State’s 
national interests are implicated, or the offense disturbs the port’s peace 
  
 244. John Hare, Port State Control: Strong Medicine to Cure a Sick Industry, 26 GA.J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 571, 571 (1997). 
 245. See Wildenhus, supra note 166, at 120. 
 246. Wildenhus, supra note 166, at 12 (“From experience, however, it was found long ago that it 
would be beneficial to commerce if the local government would abstain from interfering with the 
internal discipline of the ship, and the general regulation of the rights and duties of the officers and 
crew towards the vessel or among themselves.”). 
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or involves a non-crew member.247  For example, cognizant of foreign 
relations and economic impacts,248 and sensitive to the “onerous” and 
“speculative burden” of subjecting a ship to different rules because she is 
fortuitously in a particular port when a claim arises,249 the U.S. Supreme 
Court declined to exercise jurisdiction over a Spanish seafarer injured 
aboard a Spanish-flagged vessel in a New Jersey port.250 
Arguably, this division has come under stress in the modern exercise of 
port State control.  Port State control agreements extrapolate from a port 
State’s right to control its ports and reach a port State’s right to control 
access to its ports.251  Port States then condition access on compliance 
with labor, safety, and environmental measures that have an effect 
beyond the port itself.252  For example, port States may investigate 
whether a ship “threatens damage to the marine environment.”253  They 
may even inquire into some internal ship matters, such as crew living 
conditions.254  Perhaps in acknowledgment of traditional notions of port 
State control, generally only international—rather than domestic—
regulations are applied to visiting foreign vessels.255 
The mechanics of port State control are straightforward.  A port State 
requires ships to announce their anticipated arrival and conducts a 
preliminary analysis.256  It selects ships to inspect, based on factors 
including the type of ship, its detention record, and its classification 
society.257  Most significantly for present purposes, the port State also 
considers the detention rates of the vessel’s flag State.258  In addition to a 
  
 247. Ademuni Odeke, Port State Control and UK Law, 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 657, 660 (1997). 
See also Wildenhus, supra note 166, at 12 (“And so by comity it came to be generally understood 
among civilized nations that all matters of discipline and all things done on board which affected 
only the vessel or those belonging to her, and did not involve the peace or dignity of the country, or 
the tranquility of the port, should be left by the local government to be dealt with by the authorities 
of the nation to which the vessel belonged.”). 
 248. Romero, supra note 232, at 382-83. 
 249. Id. at 384. 
 250. Id. 
 251. DESOMBRE, supra note 81, at 89. 
 252. Hare, supra note 244, at 583 n.23. (referencing the International Convention on Load 
Lines; Safety of Life at Sea (and its protocols); International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships; Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping; Convention on the 
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, International Convention on Tonnage 
Measurement of Ships, Merchant Shipping Convention 1976 (ILO Convention No. 147). 
 253. UNCLOS, supra note 17, at Art. 219.  See also Arts. 216-220 quoted in DESOMBRE, supra 
note 81, at 90. 
 254. DESOMBRE, supra note 81, at 90 (discussing The Merchant Shipping (Minimum 
Standards) Convention (1976)). 
 255. See id. 
 256. Hare, supra note 244, at 583 n.37 (citing Ports and Waterways Safety Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 
1221-1232 (1986)). 
 257. DESOMBRE, supra note 81, at 93-94. 
 258. Id. at 95. 
30
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 19 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 12
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol19/iss1/12
2013] INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME CREATES 293 
visual examination of general condition, a preliminary inspection 
involves a document examination to ensure compliance with 
international agreements, valid registration, and current classification and 
insurance.259  A more involved inspection ensues if authorities uncover 
disparities.260  The nature of violations dictates the port authority’s 
response: it may refer the vessel to the flag State261 or it may detain the 
ship until the violation is rectified.262  Memorandums of Understanding 
among port States cover most of the world and help maximize the 
number of inspected vessels.263  In theory, this system should encourage 
flag States to adopt stricter standards to help their registered vessels 
avoid costly inspections and potential detentions.264  In fact, a survey of 
UK and Isle of Man ships found that ship owners chose those registries, 
in part, to reduce the potential for port State inspections.265 
Port State control is not a panacea, though.  Observers point out that port 
States are unlikely to exercise jurisdiction when their interests are not 
directly involved, such as an oil discharge hundreds of miles from the 
coast, because such involvement is onerous and may reduce future port 
visits.266  Observers additionally allege that some port States falsify 
reports or free ride by relying on the stricter controls of other port States’ 
to protect them.267 
Country-specific studies offer mixed results.  An investigation of 
flagging standards suggests that while port State control stemmed a “race 
to the bottom,” it is insufficient to prompt every vessel to reach the 
highest standards.268  Instead, it results in a “race to the middle,” in which 
the majority of registries have modest standards.269  In this race to the 
middle, bottom-dwellers raise their standards to reduce inspections but 
other countries emerge to replace them.270  The investigation’s author 
  
 259. Id. at 92. 
 260. Id. See also UNCLOS, supra note 17, at Art. 222(1). 
 261. DESOMBRE, supra note 81, at 90-91.  See also UNCLOS, supra note 17, at Art. 222(1). 
 262. DESOMBRE, supra note 81, at 89-90.  See also UNCLOS, supra note 17, at Art. 219, 
222(1). 
 263. DESOMBRE, supra note 81, at 91. 
 264. Anderson, supra note 57, at 168.  The flag State’s incentives are reinforced by the 
International Transport Workers’ Foundation, which targets high detention rate countries for labor 
actions.  DESOMBRE, supra note 81, at 97. 
 265. Brooks, Mary R. & J. Richard Hodgson, The Fiscal Treatment of Shipping, in SHIPPING 
ECONOMICS 160-61 (Elsevier Ltd., 2005) (citing Kevin Cullinane & Mark Robertshaw, The 
Influence of Qualitative Factors in Isle of Man Ship Registration Decisions, 23 MAR. POL’Y & 
MGMT. (Issue 4) 321-37 (1996)). 
 266. Duruigbo, supra note 53, at 132. 
 267. DESOMBRE, supra note 81, at 97. 
 268. Id. at 53. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. at 99. 
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compared individual flag detention rates to international averages, and 
discovered that port State control raised the flagging standards of 
Liberia, the Marshall Islands, Vanuatu, and Cyprus.271  However, some 
FOC States remained undeterred by baneful reputations and their costs 
for ship owners.  For example, despite persistently high detention rates, 
Honduras made only a small effort to purge the lowest standard ships 
from its registry. 
B. COASTAL STATE CONTROL 
Seemingly relying on the territorial effects principle, the international 
community has bolstered coastal State prescriptive and enforcement 
powers for civil and criminal matters.  Recall that under territorial 
effects, States can exercise jurisdiction over people and activities that 
have or are intended to have a substantial effect within their territory.  
Since effects are diminished as a vessel moves seaward, a coastal State’s 
jurisdiction correspondingly decreases.272 
Coastal State civil jurisdiction is at its maximum in territorial waters.  
Under UNCLOS, vessels in territorial waters retain a diminished 
freedom of navigation called innocent passage, which permits 
“continuous and expeditious” passage that is “not prejudicial to the 
peace, good order or security of the coastal State.”273  Coastal States may 
adopt and enforce regulations relating to inter alia, “safety of navigation 
. . . fisheries laws and regulations of the coastal State . . . [and] the 
preservation of the environment of the coastal State.”274  These rules can 
be more stringent than international rules, though they cannot hamper 
innocent passage.275  For example, a coastal State may inspect and even 
detain a vessel navigating the territorial seas if it has “clear ground for 
believing” the vessel violated international environmental regulations 
while in its territorial seas.276  Coastal States also have criminal 
jurisdiction of vessels in their territorial waters.  UNCLOS limits this 
jurisdiction to instances in which the crime’s consequences affect the 
coast State, the crime disturbs order of the territorial sea, the crime 
involves drug trafficking, or the ship’s master or flag State requests 
assistance.277 
  
 271. Id. at 98-127. 
 272. See infra notes 274-280. 
 273. UNCLOS, supra note 17, at Arts. 18-19. 
 274. Id. at Art. 21. 
 275. Id. at Art. 24, 211(4); 220(2); Duruigbo, supra note 53, at 122. 
 276. UNCLOS, supra note 17, at Art. 220(3). 
 277. Id. at Art. 27.  See also supra Section VII. Bases of Jurisdiction Other than the Flag of 
Convenience. 
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In the next zone seaward, the contiguous zone, a coastal State’s 
prescriptive jurisdiction is restricted to “prevent[ing] infringement of its 
customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations.”278  
Similarly, in the exclusive economic zone, enforcement jurisdiction is 
significantly reduced.  A port State can only detain a vessel when it 
reaches a higher standard of proof of more direct damage.279  Normally, 
the coastal State simply gathers registry and last and next ports of call 
information for violations in the exclusive economic zone.280 
C. REGISTRY REQUIREMENTS 
In a much-discussed but largely ineffective approach, the international 
community attempted to qualify vessel registrations.  Specifically, it 
mandated a “genuine link” between the registering State and vessel.  This 
approach epitomizes the tension between traditional maritime principles 
and challenges of the new order: the international community has 
struggled to define “genuine link” in light of the understanding that State 
sovereignty includes the right to set registry terms. 
The “genuine link” language arose from the Nottebohm Case, which held 
that an individual’s citizenship is based on “a genuine connection of 
existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of 
reciprocal rights and duties.”281  Three years later, the Convention on the 
High Seas asserted, “[t]here must exist a genuine link between the State 
and the ship.”282  Seemingly contradictorily, it also affirmed that “[e]ach 
State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships.”283  A 
quarter-century later, UNCLOS incorporated nearly identical language.284  
The Restatement similarly outlines a genuine link requirement, while 
acknowledging that States must recognize flags that lack such a link.285 
The genuine link requirement has been largely toothless for at least two 
reasons.  First, as indicated above, the documents themselves seem to 
schizophrenically condition a State’s right to register and simultaneously 
  
 278. UNCLOS, supra note 17, at Art. 33. 
 279. Id. at Art. 220(6). 
 280. Id. at Art. 220(3).  Under some heightened circumstances, the coastal State can inspect the 
vessel.  Id. at Art. 220(5). 
 281. Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6), at 23.  See also Anderson, supra 
note 57, at 149; Duruigbo, supra note 53, at 118. 
 282. 1958 Convention, supra note 19, at Art. 5. 
 283. Id. 
 284. See UNCLOS, supra note 17, at Art. 91(1) (“Every State shall fix the conditions for the 
grant of its nationality to ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its 
flag . . . There must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship.”). 
 285. RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 501 Comment b. 
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grant a sweeping right to register.286  Second, “genuine link” is 
inadequately defined.  Nottebohm discusses “reciprocal rights and 
duties,” but in the context of vessel registration – vice human citizenship 
– rights and duties seem to arise from, rather than precede, registering.287  
This view is reinforced by an explanatory clause following the 1958 
Convention’s genuine link requirement: “in particular, the State must 
effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, 
technical and social matters over ships flying its flag.”288  Thus, it appears 
that a genuine link exists when a State exercises jurisdiction, which it 
would only do after a vessel is registered.289 
The United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships 
(UNCCORS)290 attempted to close this gap by defining genuine link.  
Specifically, it required that States either291 prescribe the “level of 
[national ownership] participation”292 or mandate that “a satisfactory 
part” of the officers and crews are nationals.293  However, it failed to 
define what constitutes a sufficient “level of participation” or a 
“satisfactory part.”294  Therefore, UNCCORS probably does not add teeth 
to the genuine link requirement.295 
The international community has also tried to regulate standards.  For 
example, UNCLOS demands that flag States promulgate pollution laws 
that “have the same effect as that of generally accepted international 
rules and standards.”296  However, of the jurisdictional bases discussed 
earlier, none applies to pollution laws; that is covered only by 
international agreements.  Thus, there is seemingly no jurisdictional basis 
for enforcement of these regulations other than international agreement.  
Further, it is unclear what consequences result from ignoring this 
requirement. 
  
 286. See supra notes 281-285. 
 287. Anderson, supra note 57, at 149. 
 288. 1958 Convention, supra note 19, at Art. 5. 
 289. See Anderson, supra note 57, at 150. 
 290. United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships, May 1 1986-Apr. 30 
1987, 26 I.L.M. 1229 (1987) [hereinafter UNCCORS]. 
 291. Id. at Art. 7. 
 292. Id. at Art. 8. 
 293. Id. at Art. 9. 
 294. Anderson, supra note 57, at 151.   
 295. Id.Cf Duruigbo, supra note 53, at 120 (arguing that UNCCORS may be a minor addition to 
the genuine link definition). 
 296. UNCLOS, supra note 17, at Art 211(2).  See also id. at Art. 217. 
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D. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 
International agreements are another widely used mechanism to maintain 
order on the seas among FOC vessels.  Recall that States, which as a 
matter of sovereignty can limit their own sovereignty, can grant 
jurisdiction to foreign States.  International conventions such as 
UNCLOS, is one such example.  The International Maritime 
Organization, a United Nations body, has passed a number of other 
conventions related to, among other topics, safety, pollution, and 
liability.297  In addition, States often sign smaller, more targeted 
agreements.  For example, the United States has negotiated twenty-six 
bilateral agreements permitting U.S. enforcement of U.S. maritime drug 
laws on foreign vessels.298 
While surely useful, international agreements also have shortcomings.  
First, they may counterproductively encourage nefarious ship owners to 
register in precisely those States that are most detached from the 
international community.  Second, agreements cannot possibly cover 
every eventuality.  Third, there is a significant time lag between 
identifying a problem, agreeing to convention terms, and achieving 
domestic ratification.299 
E. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 
Universal jurisdiction, or jurisdiction over activities that are condemned 
by international law, offers just a toehold for maintaining maritime order, 
because few crimes rise to this level of concern.  UNCLOS only permits 
high seas seizure of a foreign ship in the event of piracy.300  UNCLOS 
more liberally grants the right to board a foreign vessel on the high seas 
when there is reasonable suspicion that it is engaged in piracy, the slave 
trade, or unauthorized broadcasting, that it is without nationality, or that 
it is obscuring its nationality as identical to the boarding ship’s.301 
  
 297. See List of IMO Conventions, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx (last accessed 
March 18, 2013). 
 298. Cardales-Luna, supra note 200, at 742. 
 299. Introduction: Adopting a Convention, Entry Into Force, Accession, Amendment, 
Enforcement, Tacit Acceptance Procedure, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION, 
www.imo.org/About/Conventions/Pages/Home.aspx (last visited March 18, 2013).  Novel 
acceptance procedures, such as not requiring States’ affirmative acceptance for technical 
amendments, in part alleviate this lag.  
 300. UNCLOS, supra note 17, at Art. 105.  But see Cardales-Luna, supra note 200, at 746 
(asserting that UNCLOS also considers the slave trade as universally condemned under UNCLOS 
Art. 99).  UNCLOS Art. 99 instructs flag States to punish the transport of slaves; it does not permit 
universal jurisdiction over slave transport ships. 
 301. UNCLOS, supra note 17, at Art. 110. 
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F. LIFT THE CORPORATE VEIL 
In addition, courts sometimes resist the mechanical application of the law 
of the flag when they believe a ship’s flag poorly reflects its activities.  
Instead, they lift the corporate veil to reach the ship’s true owners via 
domestic jurisdiction.  Courts inconsistently lift the corporate veil which, 
if applied universally, would seemingly unravel not just flags of 
convenience but also the law of the flag, generally.  Therefore, it is 
difficult to annunciate a unifying rule. 
Generally, United States’ courts use the multi-factor Lauritzen test, 
which resembles the Restatement’s reasonability test, to evaluate the 
reach of international law.302  Sporadically, they incorporate a “base of 
operations” factor Rhoditis added to the inquiry two decades after 
Lauritzen.303  In Rhoditis, the eighth factor enabled the Court to ignore 
the “façade” of a Greek-flagged ship that was nearly entirely owned by a 
Connecticut domiciliary who managed the corporation out of New York 
and operated mostly in America.304  Similarly, in Rainbow Line, Inc. v. 
M/V Tequila, the Second Circuit found that American ownership 
“overshadowed” British registration and nominal British ownership.305  
There are British, French, and Canadian opinions to the same effect.306  
For example, a frustrated British court analogized corporate smoke-and-
mirrors to pirates in remarking, “[p]irates carried the flag of every nation, 
but they were hanged by every nation notwithstanding.”307  In summary, 
although discounting the corporate structure is not a standard practice, 
courts do occasionally lift the corporate veil. 
G. NATIONAL CONTROL 
In limited circumstances, States have expanded maritime jurisdiction 
based on an actor’s nationality.  Recall that the tenuous nationality 
principle grants States jurisdiction over their citizens, regardless of where 
the harm occurs.  UNCLOS adopted this principle with respect to 
  
 302. See supra notes 233-43 and accompanying text. 
 303. Symeonides, supra note 171, at 240; Tetley, supra note 41, at 183. 
 304. Rhoditis, supra note 242, at 307, 310. 
 305. Rainbow Line, Inc. v. M/V Tequila, 480 F.2d 1024, 1027 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1973).  The court 
noted, “it is well settled that courts will look through the façade of foreign registration and 
incorporation to the American ownership behind it” (citations omitted). 
 306. Tetley, supra note 41, at 180-83 (citing Chartered Mercantile Bank of India v. Netherlands, 
[1883] 10 Q.B.D. 521 (Eng. C.A.) (Eng.); Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial 
matters], Feb. 12, 1991, 505 Le Droit Maritime Francais 315) (Fr.); Cass., July 4, 1989, 488 Le Droit 
Maritime Francais 639 (1984) (Fr.); Courd'Appeld'Aix-en-Provence, March 11, 1988, 484 Le Droit 
Maritime Francais 367 (1989) (Fr.);.Kuhr v. The “Friedrich Busse,” [1982] 134 D.L.R. 3d 261 
(Can.); Kosmopoulos v. Constitution Insurance, Co., [1987] 1 S.C.R. 2 (Can.)). 
 307. Tetley, supra note 41, at 181 (quoting Chartered Mercantile, supra note 306, at 535). 
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collisions and other navigational incidents: it permits concurrent 
jurisdiction of the flag State and the citizenship State of the master and 
other personnel.308 
H. DOMESTIC SHIPPING PROTECTIONS 
States have enacted numerous measures to address the national security 
concerns of a reduced merchant marine.  These include incentives for 
domestic flagging and emergency control of foreign ships. 
A number of government programs incentivize ship owners to flag in the 
United States.  They are intended to promote a domestic maritime 
industry – shipbuilding infrastructure, shipbuilders, and seafarers – for 
mobilization in the event of war of national emergency.309  For example, 
under the Jones Act, shipments between United States ports are restricted 
to vessels that were American-built and are owned and crewed by 
Americans.310  To retain domestic shipping, Norway, Denmark, France, 
Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Germany, and the U.K. have experimented 
with “second registries.”311  The lower taxes of these shadow registries 
are intended to attract ship owners.312 
The United States has also adopted programs to assure emergency 
maritime transportation access.  One such initiative, the U.S. Maritime 
Security Program, subsidizes sixty United States-flagged vessels that 
agree to be available for official transport upon the Secretary of 
Defense’s request.313  Also, the U.S. Merchant Marine Act of 1936 grants 
the United States “effective control” of ships that are majority United 
States-owned but registered in Panama, Liberia, the Bahamas, Honduras, 
and the Marshall Islands.314  The flag States apparently tolerate this 
sovereignty encroachment as an insurance payment against forceful 
United States interference with the FOC regime.315  The size and 
  
 308. UNCLOS, supra note 17, at Art. 97. 
 309. See, e.g., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21566, THE JONES ACT (updated 2003). 
 310. 46 U.S.C. 30104.  Canada has similar requirements for domestic shipping.  See Brooks & 
Hodgson supra 265, at 151-52. 
 311. Wiswall, supra note 92, at 111-13. 
 312. Id. 
 313. U.S. Department of Transportation Maritime Administration, Maritime Security Program, 
http://www.marad.dot.gov/ships_shipping_landing_page/national_security/maritime_security_progr
am/maritime_security_program.htm (last visited March 18, 2013). 
 314. DESOMBRE, supra note 81, at 214-15. 
 315. DESOMBRE, supra note 81, at 215. 
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effectiveness of this fleet is potentially quite limited,316and this 
arrangement remains untested.317 
I. ACT IN CONTRAVENTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Finally, sovereign States may act in contravention of international law.  
Well-established U.S. precedent recognizes that Congress’s 
constitutional powers sometimes exceed international law constraints.318  
However, this reach is rarely exercised319 and is likely to excite 
international opinion. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Historical principles remain the cornerstone of the maritime legal regime.  
As this paper described, the original principles set the scene for the rise 
of FOC States, which often enjoy exclusive civil, criminal, and 
regulatory jurisdiction.  This paper explored—theoretically and 
empirically—how the divergent motives of FOC States and the 
international community may disrupt the tenuous stability of the 
maritime commons.  The rapid expansion of global commerce, 
migration, and communication ensure that this jurisdictional quandary 
will continue to increase in importance.  There is a pressing need to re-
envision the maritime legal regime.  It is this author’s hope that 
policymakers become inspired to develop options based on the 
alternative jurisdictional bases discussed in this paper. 
 
  
 316. See Henry S. Marcus, et al., “Increasing the Size of the Effective United States Control 
Fleet,” MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (August 2002), 
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a408239.pdf. 
 317. DESOMBRE, supra note 81, at 214-15; Mr. Heindel comments before the Special Oversight 
Panel on the Merchant Marine, “Vessel Operations Under Flags of Convenience and Their 
Implications on National Security,” 107th Congress, June 13, 2002.  See also, Anderson, supra note 
57, at 144 (discussing the U.K.’s need to charter international ships during the First Gulf War). 
 318. See supra notes 212-234 and accompanying text. 
 319. Id. 
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